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A
n interest rate swap is a contractual agreement between two parties
to exchange a series of interest rate payments without exchanging the
underlying debt. The interest rate swap represents one example of a
general category of ﬁnancial instruments known as derivative instruments. In
the most general terms, a derivative instrument is an agreement whose value
derives from some underlying market return, market price, or price index.
The rapid growth of the market for swaps and other derivatives in re-
cent years has spurred considerable controversy over the economic rationale
for these instruments. Many observers have expressed alarm over the growth
and size of the market, arguing that interest rate swaps and other derivative
instruments threaten the stability of ﬁnancial markets. Recently, such fears
have led both legislators and bank regulators to consider measures to curb the
growth of the market. Several legislators have begun to promote initiatives
to create an entirely new regulatory agency to supervise derivatives trading
activity. Underlying these initiatives is the premise that derivative instruments
increase aggregate risk in the economy, either by encouraging speculation or by
burdening ﬁrms with risks that management does not understand fully and is
incapable of controlling.1 To be certain, much of this criticism is aimed at many
of the more exotic derivative instruments that have begun to appear recently.
Nevertheless, it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to appreciate the economic role
of these more exotic instruments without an understanding of the role of the
interest rate swap, the most basic of the new generation of ﬁnancial derivatives.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
views of either the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. The motivation for this article grew out of discussions with Douglas
Diamond. Michael Dotsey, Jeff Lacker, Roy Webb, and John Weinberg provided thoughtful
criticism and helpful comments.
1 For a review of these stated concerns, recent policy initiatives, and pending legislation, see
Cummins (1994a, 1994b), Karr (1994), and Rehm (1994).
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Although the factors accounting for the remarkable growth of the swaps
market are yet to be fully understood, ﬁnancial economists have proposed a
number of different hypotheses to explain how and why ﬁrms use interest rate
swaps. The early explanation, popular among market participants, was that
interest rate swaps lowered ﬁnancing costs by making it possible for ﬁrms to
arbitrage the mispricing of credit risk. If this were the only rationale for interest
rate swaps, however, it would mean that these instruments exist only to facil-
itate a way around market inefﬁciencies and should become redundant once
arbitrage leads market participants to begin pricing credit risk correctly. Thus,
trading in interest rate swaps should die out over time as arbitrage opportunities
disappear—a prediction that is at odds with actual experience.
Other observers note that the advent of the interest rate swap coincided with
a period of extraordinary volatility in U.S. market interest rates, leading them
to attribute the rapid growth of interest rate derivatives to the desire on the part
of ﬁrms to hedge cash ﬂows against the effects of interest rate volatility. The
timing of the appearance of interest rate swaps, coming as it did during a pe-
riod of volatile rates, seems to lend support to such arguments. Risk avoidance
alone cannot explain the growth of the swaps market, however, because ﬁrms
can always protect themselves against rising interest rates simply by taking
out ﬁxed-rate, long-term loans or by bypassing credit markets altogether and
issuing equity to fund investments.
Recent research emphasizes that interest rate swaps offer ﬁrms new
ﬁnancing choices that were just not available before the advent of these instru-
ments, and thus represent a true ﬁnancial innovation. This research suggests
that the ﬁnancing choices made available by interest rate swaps may help to
reduce default risk and may sometimes make it possible for ﬁrms to undertake
productive investments that would not be feasible otherwise. The discussion
that follows explains the basic mechanics of interest rate swaps and examines
these rationales in more detail.
1. FUNDAMENTALS OF INTEREST RATE SWAPS
The most common type of interest rate swap is the ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap in
which a ﬁxed-rate payer promises to make periodic payments based on a ﬁxed
interest rate to a ﬂoating-rate payer, who in turn agrees to make variable pay-
ments indexed to some short-term interest rate. Conventionally, the parties to
the agreement are termed counterparties. The size of the payments exchanged
by the counterparties is based on some stipulated notional principal amount,
which itself is not paid or received.
Interest rate swaps are traded over the counter. The over-the-counter (OTC)
market is comprised of a group of dealers, consisting of major international
commercial and investment banks, who communicate offers to buy and sell      
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swaps over telecommunications networks. Swap dealers intermediate cash ﬂows
between different customers, acting as middlemen for each transaction. These
dealers act as market makers who quote bid and asked prices at which they
stand ready to either buy or sell an interest rate swap before a customer for
the other half of the transaction can be found. (By convention, the ﬁxed-rate
payer in an interest rate swap is termed the buyer, while the ﬂoating-rate payer
is termed the seller.) The quoted spread allows the dealer to receive a higher
payment from one counterparty than is paid to the other.
Because swap dealers act as intermediaries, a swap customer need be
concerned only with the ﬁnancial condition of the dealer and not with the
creditworthiness of the other ultimate counterparty to the agreement. Counter-
party credit risk refers to the risk that a counterparty to an interest rate swap
will default when the agreement has value to the other party.2 Managing the
credit risk associated with swap transactions requires credit-evaluation skills
similar to those commonly associated with bank lending. As a result, commer-
cial banks, which have traditionally specialized in credit-risk evaluation and
have the capital reserves necessary to support credit-risk management, have
come to dominate the market for interest rate swaps (Smith, Smithson, and
Wakeman 1986).
The discussion that follows largely abstracts from counterparty credit risk
and the role of swap dealers. In addition, the description of interest rate swaps
is stylized and omits many market conventions and other details so as to focus
on the fundamental economic features of swap transactions. For a more de-
tailed description of interest rate swaps and other interest rate derivatives, see
Kuprianov (1993b). Burghardt et al. (1991) and Marshall and Kapner (1993)
provide more comprehensive treatments.
Mechanics of a Fixed/Floating Swap
The quoted price of an interest rate swap consists of two different interest rates.
In the case of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap, the quoted interest rates involve a ﬁxed and
a ﬂoating rate. The ﬂoating interest rate typically is indexed to some market-
determined rate such as the Treasury bill rate or, more commonly, the three-
or six-month London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR.3 Such a swap is also
known as a generic, or plain-vanilla, swap.
The basic mechanics of a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap are relatively straightforward.
Consider an interest rate swap in which the parties to the agreement agree to
2 An increase in market interest rates, for example, increases the value of a swap agreement
to the ﬁxed-rate payer, who will subsequently receive higher interest rate payments from the
ﬂoating-rate payer.
3 The London Interbank Offered Rate is the rate at which major international banks with
ofﬁces in London stand ready to accept deposits from one another. See Goodfriend (1993) or
Burghardt et al. (1991) for a detailed description of the Eurodollar market.       
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exchange payments at the end of each of T periods, indexed by the variable
t = 1 ,2 ,...,T. Let rs denote the ﬁxed rate and rs(t) denote the ﬂoating
interest rate on a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap. Payments between the ﬁxed- and ﬂoating-
rate payers commonly are scheduled for the same dates, in which case only net
amounts owed are exchanged. The net cost of the swap to the ﬁxed-rate payer
at the end of each period would be rs −rs(t) for each $1 of notional principal.
If the swap’s ﬁxed rate is greater than the variable rate at the end of a period
(i.e., rs > rs(t)), then the ﬁxed-rate payer must pay the difference between
the ﬁxed interest payment on the notional principal to the ﬂoating-rate payer.
Otherwise, the difference rs−rs(t) is negative, meaning that the ﬁxed-rate payer
receives the difference from the ﬂoating-rate payer. The net cost of the swap
to the ﬂoating-rate payer is just the negative of this amount. For the sake of
notational convenience, the discussion that follows assumes that all swaps have
a notional principal of $1, unless otherwise noted.
Uses of Interest Rate Swaps—Synthetic Financing
Firms use interest rate swaps to change the effective maturity of interest-bearing
assets or liabilities. To illustrate, suppose a ﬁrm has short-term bank debt out-
standing. At the start of each period this ﬁrm reﬁnances its debt at the prevailing
short-term interest rate, rb(t). If short-term market interest rates are volatile, then
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing costs will be volatile as well. By entering into an interest
rate swap, the ﬁrm can change its short-term ﬂoating-rate debt into a synthetic
ﬁxed-rate obligation.
Suppose the ﬁrm enters into an interest rate swap as a ﬁxed-rate payer. Its
resulting net payments in each period t = 1 ,2 ,...,T of the agreement are
determined by adding the net payments required of a ﬁxed-rate payer to the
cost of servicing its outstanding ﬂoating-rate debt.
Period t cost of servicing outstanding short-term debt rb(t)
+ Period t cost of interest rate swap payments rs − rs(t)
= Period t cost of synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing rs +[rb(t)−rs(t)]
Thus, the net cost of the synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing is determined by the
swap ﬁxed rate plus the difference between its short-term borrowing rate and
the ﬂoating-rate index.
Banks often index the short-term loan rates they charge their corporate
customers to LIBOR. Suppose the ﬁrm in this example is able to borrow at
LIBOR plus a credit-quality risk premium, or credit-quality spread, q(t).
Suppose further that the swap’s ﬂoating-rate index is LIBOR. Then,
rb(t) − rs(t) = [LIBOR(t) + q(t)] − LIBOR(t)
= q(t).          
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The period t cost of synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing in this case is just rs + q(t),
the swap ﬁxed rate plus the short-term credit-quality spread q(t).
Now consider the other side to this transaction. Suppose a ﬁrm with out-
standing ﬁxed-rate debt on which it pays an interest rate of rb enters into a swap
as a ﬂoating-rate payer so as to convert its ﬁxed-rate obligation to a synthetic
ﬂoating-rate note. The net period t cost of this synthetic note is just the cost of
its ﬁxed-rate obligation plus the net cost of the swap:
Period t cost of synthetic ﬂoating rate note = rs(t) + (rb − rs).
The cost of synthetic ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing just equals the ﬂoating rate on the
interest rate swap plus the difference between the interest rate the ﬁrm pays
on its outstanding ﬁxed-rate debt and the ﬁxed interest rate it receives from its
swap counterparty.
Thus, interest rate swaps can be used to change the characteristics of a
ﬁrm’s outstanding debt obligations. Using interest rate swaps, ﬁrms can change
ﬂoating-rate debt into synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing or, alternatively, a ﬁxed-
rate obligation into synthetic ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing. But these observations
raise an obvious question. Why would a ﬁrm issue short-term debt only to
swap its interest payments into a longer-term, ﬁxed-rate obligation rather than
just issue long-term, ﬁxed-rate debt at the outset? Conversely, why would a ﬁrm
issue long-term debt and swap it into synthetic ﬂoating-rate debt rather than
simply issuing ﬂoating-rate debt at the outset? The next two sections explore
the rationales that have been offered to explain the widespread use of interest
rate swaps.
2. INTEREST RATE SWAPS, ARBITRAGE, AND THE
THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The rapid growth of the swaps market in recent years strongly suggests that
market participants must perceive signiﬁcant beneﬁts associated with the use of
such instruments. The rationale most frequently offered by market participants
is that interest rate swaps offer users an opportunity to reduce funding costs.4
Bicksler and Chen (1986) present what is perhaps the best-known exposition
of this viewpoint, which is based on the principle of comparative advantage.
In international trade theory, the principle of comparative advantage explains
the economic rationale for international trade by showing how different coun-
tries facing different opportunity costs in the production of different goods
can beneﬁt from free trade with other countries. According to Bicksler and
Chen, differential information in different markets, institutional restrictions,
and transactions costs create “some market imperfections and the presence
4 For example, see Rudnick (1987).       
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of comparative advantages among different borrowers in these markets” (p.
646). These market imperfections, according to Bicksler and Chen, provide the
economic rationale for interest rate swaps.
The Quality-Spread Differential
All ﬁrms pay a credit-quality premium over the risk-free rate when they issue
debt securities. These credit-quality premiums grow larger as the maturity of
the debt increases. Thus, whereas a ﬁrm, call it ﬁrm A, might pay a credit-
risk premium of 50 basis points over the risk-free rate on its short-term debt
obligations, the credit-quality premium it is required to pay on longer-term
debt, say ten-year bonds, might rise to 100 basis points.
Not surprisingly, ﬁrms with good credit ratings pay lower risk premiums
than ﬁrms with lower credit ratings. Moreover, the credit-quality premium rises
faster with maturity for poorer credits than for good credits. Thus, if ﬁrm B
has a poorer credit rating than ﬁrm A, it might pay a credit-risk premium of
100 basis points on its short-term debt while ﬁnding it necessary to pay 250
basis points over the risk-free rate to issue long-term bonds. The quality spread
between the interest rate paid by the lower-rated ﬁrm and that paid by the
higher-rated ﬁrm is only 50 basis points in the short-term debt market, but
rises to 150 basis points at longer maturities. The quality-spread differential,
the difference in the quality spread at two different maturities, is 100 basis
points in this example. Firm A has an absolute cost advantage in raising funds
in either the short- or long-term debt markets, but ﬁrm B has a comparative
advantage in raising funds in short-term debt markets.
To explore this line of reasoning in more detail, suppose ﬁrms A and B
both need to borrow funds for the next two periods, t = 1,2. Let rf(t) denote
the period t short-term (one-period) risk-free interest rate and rf the long-term
(two-period) ﬁxed risk-free rate. The period t cost of short-term debt to ﬁrm A
is the short-term risk-free rate plus the credit-quality spread qA(t). To issue long-
term ﬁxed-rate debt, ﬁrm A would be required to pay rf +qA, where qA denotes
the long-term quality spread. Deﬁne qB(t) and qB analogously. Assuming ﬁrm
A has the better credit rating,
qA(1) ≤ qB(1),and
qA ≤ qB.
An increasing quality spread means that
qB(1) − qA(1) < qB − qA.
Conditions Necessary for Arbitrage to Be Feasible
Under certain assumptions, both ﬁrms could lower their funding costs if ﬁrm
A were to issue long-term debt, ﬁrm B were to issue short-term debt, and they      
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swapped interest payments. To see how this would work, assume A and B enter
into an interest rate swap with B as a ﬁxed-rate payer and A as the ﬂoating-rate
payer. As above, let rs denote the ﬁxed swap rate for a two-period agreement.
To minimize the notational burden, assume that the swap ﬂoating rate is just
the risk-free rate of interest, rf(t). The resulting period t (t = 1,2) net cost of
synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing to ﬁrm B is:
Period t cost of servicing short-term, ﬂoating-rate debt rf(t) + qB(t)
+ Period t cost of interest rate swap rs − rf(t)
= Period t cost of synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing rs + qB(t)
The synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing will be less costly for ﬁrm B than actual
ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing in each period t if and only if
rs + qB(t) ≤ rf + qB,
which implies
rs − rf ≤ qB − qB(t).
The term on the left-hand side of the last expression is the swap ﬁxed-rate
credit-quality spread, or risk premium, over the risk-free long-term interest
rate. Thus, the quality spread associated with the swap ﬁxed rate must be less
than the increase in the credit-risk premium ﬁrm B would need to pay to issue
long-term debt. Otherwise, synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing will not be cheaper
than actual ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing.
Now examine the transaction from the vantage point of ﬁrm A, the ﬂoating-
rate payer. The cost of synthetic ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing is determined by the
cost of servicing ﬁxed-rate debt plus the net cost of the swap:
Period t cost of servicing ﬁxed-rate debt rf + qA
+ Period t cost of swap rs(t) − rs
= Period t cost of synthetic ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing rs(t)+(rf +qA −rs)
Period t synthetic ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing will cost less than actual ﬂoating-rate
ﬁnancing for ﬁrm A if
rs(t) + (rf + qA − rs) ≤ rs(t) + qA(t),
which, in turn, requires that
qA − qA(t) ≤ rs − rf.
That is, the increase in the credit-quality premium ﬁrm A must pay when
issuing long-term ﬁxed-rate debt must be smaller than the risk premium it
receives from the swap’s ﬁxed-rate payer.       
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Combining results, ﬁrm A will have a comparative advantage in issuing
long-term debt and ﬁrm B in issuing short-term debt if
qA − qA(t) ≤ rs − rf ≤ qB − qB(t), t = 1,2.
For the ﬂoating-rate payer, synthetic ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing is cheaper than
actual short-term ﬁnancing if the interest rate swap quality spread (which the
ﬂoating-rate payer receives) is greater than the added interest expense of long-
term debt. For the ﬁxed-rate payer, synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing is less costly
than issuing long-term bonds if the premium of the ﬁxed swap rate over the
two-period risk-free rate is less than the difference between its long-term and
short-term quality spreads. Both parties will enjoy gains from trade if the swap
ﬂoating-rate payer charges the ﬁxed-rate payer a smaller credit-quality spread
than the ﬁxed-rate payer would be forced to pay in the bond market.
The astute reader will notice that the conditions outlined above require the
parties to the agreement to know future values of qA(t) and qB(t). Both ﬁrms
know their current short-term quality spreads along with qA and qB at the start
of period 1. But it is unrealistic to assume that ﬁrms will know their future
short-term quality spreads with certainty. Bicksler and Chen (1986) implicitly
assume that ﬁrms expect the above relations to hold (at least on average) based
on the past behavior of the quality-spread differential.
There is empirical evidence that long-term quality spreads for lower-rated
counterparties are lower in the interest rate swap market than in credit markets
(Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang 1993). Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1988)
and Litzenberger (1992), among others, note that the expected loss to a swap
counterparty in the event of a default is much less than that associated with
holding a bond because interest rate swaps are not funding transactions and in-
volve no exchange of principal. Moreover, swaps receive preferential treatment
under the Bankruptcy Code in the event of a default. Under these conditions
it may not seem surprising to ﬁnd that quality spreads do not increase as
rapidly in the swap market and that the cost of synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing
often seems lower than that of actual long-term ﬁnancing. But while interest
rate swaps might offer ﬁrms a way around paying increasing quality-spread
differentials, synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing does not offer ﬁrms the proverbial
“free lunch.” As the following discussion will show, the risks responsible for
increasing quality-spread differentials do not disappear when ﬁrms use interest
rate swaps.
Criticisms of the Comparative Advantage Rationale
Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986, 1988) argue that observed behavior in
the swap market is not consistent with classic ﬁnancial arbitrage of the type
described by proponents of the comparative advantage rationale. The use of
interest rate swaps to arbitrage quality-spread differentials, they argue, should
increase the demand for short-term loans among ﬁrms with poor credit ratings     
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while reducing demand for “overpriced” long-term loans. Eventually, such a
process should reduce quality-spread differentials and therefore reduce demand
for interest rate swaps. In fact, Bicksler and Chen (1986) did report evidence
of declining quality-spread differentials as interest rate swaps came into wide-
spread use. But trading activity in interest rate swaps has shown no sign of
abating even as quality-spread differentials have declined. To the contrary, the
market for interest rate swaps has grown exponentially since these instruments
were ﬁrst introduced in the early 1980s. According to the International Swap
and Derivatives Association, the total notional principal amount of interest rate
swaps outstanding has risen from $683 billion in 1987 to just over $3.8 trillion
as of year-end 1992.
Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986, 1988) observe that much of the
apparent savings from the use of swaps can be attributed to the absence of a
prepayment option on generic swaps. Fixed-rate bonds typically carry a pre-
payment option that allows the borrower to call and refund a debt issue should
market interest rates fall. The cost of this option is incorporated into the interest
rate the ﬁrm is required to pay on such bonds. In contrast, the generic interest
rate swap carries no such prepayment option. Early termination of a swap
agreement requires the value of the contract to be marked to market, with any
remaining amounts to be paid in full. A borrower can buy a “callable” swap,
which permits early termination, but must pay an additional premium for this
option. Thus, to be fair, the cost of actual long-term debt should be compared
to the cost of callable synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing, which would reduce the
measured cost advantage resulting from the use of interest rate swaps.
Another problem with the comparative advantage rationale, noted by Smith,
Smithson, and Wakeman (1988), is that it does not address the underlying
reason for the existence of quality-spread differentials between short- and long-
term debt. Loeys (1985) notes that short-term creditors implicitly hold an option
to refuse to reﬁnance outstanding loans. He attributes the difference in qual-
ity spreads between short- and long-term debt to the value of that implicit
option.5 But while this option is valuable to lenders, it increases the risk of
a future funding crisis to the borrowing ﬁrm, thereby increasing the risk of
bankruptcy proceedings. The risk that lenders will refuse to reﬁnance out-
standing short-term debt is known as liquidity risk, or rollover risk. From the
ﬁrm’s perspective, added liquidity risk represents an implicit cost of short-term
ﬁnancing.
Bansal, Bicksler, Chen, and Marshall (1993) compare the cost of synthetic
ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing with the cost of actual ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing when the hidden
costs noted above are taken into account. They control for the cost of liquidity
5 Wall and Pringle (1987) note that Loeys’ hypothesis is only consistent with increasing
quality-spread differentials if the ability of short-term debtholders to refuse to renew outstanding
debt makes it easier to force reorganization of a ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrm.       
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risk by adding in the expense of a bank standby letter of credit in which a bank
guarantees that it will assume a ﬁrm’s outstanding debt if the ﬁrm ﬁnds itself
unable to roll over a commercial paper issue. To take account of the value of a
prepayment option, they add the premium on a callable swap into the total cost
of synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing. Finally, they also take account of transactions
and administrative costs. The cost advantage of synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing
disappears once these costs are taken into account. Bansal et al. conclude that
“a signiﬁcant part of the reputed gains from swaps . . . were illusory, stemming
from the way the gains have been calculated in practice” (p. 91).
3. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1988) hypothesize that the rationale for inter-
est rate swaps lies with their usefulness in creating new synthetic ﬁnancial
instruments for risk management. The early 1980s brought unprecedented
interest rate volatility, exposing ﬁrms to the risk of ﬂuctuating funding costs.
Rawls and Smithson (1990) argue that these events led to an increased demand
for risk-management services on the part of ﬁrms. Smith, Smithson, and Wake-
man (1988) argue that the growth of the swaps market effectively increased
market liquidity for forward interest rate contracts, citing rapidly falling bid-
ask spreads for interest rate swaps as evidence.6 Thus, they argue, trading in
interest rate swaps has helped to complete forward markets and to lower the
cost to ﬁrms of managing their exposure to interest rate risk.
The Role for Hedging in the Theory of Corporate Finance
The foregoing discussion has focused on increased volatility in ﬁnancial mar-
kets as the major factor behind the growth of the derivatives market in recent
years. That ﬁrms would wish to hedge against the risk of such volatility simply
has been assumed. But as Smith, Smithson, and Wilford (1990) note, much
of textbook portfolio theory suggests that not hedging might be a ﬁrm’s best
policy. The well-known Modigliani-Miller theorem states that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
decisions have no effect on its market value when (1) a ﬁrm’s management and
outside investors share the same information about the returns accruing to all
investment projects; (2) transactions costs are negligible; (3) a ﬁrm’s tax bill is
not affected by its ﬁnancing decisions; and (4) the costs of ﬁnancial distress are
inconsequential. Under these assumptions, portfolio theory holds that individual
investors can efﬁciently diversify away volatility in individual ﬁrm proﬁts at
6 An interest rate swap can be viewed as a bundle of forward contracts (see Smith, Smith-
son, and Wakeman [1988]). Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang (1993) ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads in the
interest rate swap market are smaller than those in the underlying market for long-term, ﬁxed-rate
corporate debt.   
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least as well as the ﬁrms themselves. If so, there is no reason for ﬁrms to
expend resources hedging against volatility in future cash ﬂows.
When these assumptions are relaxed, however, ﬁnancing decisions may
affect a ﬁrm’s value. First, a ﬁrm’s managers can be expected to know more
about the risks and returns to different investment projects than outside
investors. Second, the existence of transactions costs makes some kinds of
ﬁnancing decisions more costly than others. Third, a volatile cash ﬂow stream
can make a ﬁrm more susceptible to ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy, which
can be extremely costly as well as threatening management with loss of control.
Fourth, existing tax laws favor certain forms of funding over others. Firms are
permitted to treat interest payments on debt as a tax-deductible expense, but
not dividend payments to shareholders. Moreover, tax laws sometimes favor
the use of certain derivative instruments to restructure cash ﬂows. For all these
reasons, ﬁrms will sometimes have incentives to hedge their cash ﬂows.
Agency Costs as a Rationale for Interest Rate Swaps:
Incentives to Undertake Synthetic Fixed-Rate Financing
Miller (1977) stresses the tax advantages of debt to explain why ﬁrms ﬁnance
their investments with a combination of debt and equity. As Jensen and
Meckling (1976) note, however, ﬁrms issued debt long before corporate in-
come taxes came into existence. As an alternative rationale for debt, Jensen
and Meckling emphasize the difﬁculty outside investors face in evaluating
the performance of managers. As deﬁned by Jensen and Meckling, an agency
relationship is “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s))
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (p. 308). If
principals could always costlessly monitor the behavior of their agents, they
could ensure that agents would always act in their best interests. Monitoring
the behavior of agents is costly, however, and requires principals to expend
resources. Thus, the agent might be required to incur certain bonding expen-
ditures. Finally, if principals cannot ensure that agents will always act in their
best interests despite monitoring and bonding, there may be some deadweight
residual loss. Jensen and Meckling deﬁne “agency costs” as the sum of these
expenditures. They show that debt ﬁnance can reduce overall agency costs for
a ﬁrm, but their analysis does not consider the problem of interest rate volatility
and the question of whether a ﬁrm should issue short-term or long-term debt.
Interest rate volatility would not affect the investment or ﬁnancing deci-
sions of ﬁrms if revenues were always perfectly correlated with changes in
market interest rates, because revenues would vary along with debt servicing
costs in this case. Revenues typically are not perfectly correlated with market
interest rates, however. As a result, interest rate volatility can increase the risk
of ﬁnancial distress. If ﬁnancial distress is costly (because of the administrative      
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costs of bankruptcy proceedings), or if the ﬁrm’s management values its right
to exercise control over the affairs of the organization, management will have
an incentive to mitigate such risks. Ideally, then, a ﬁrm would wish to schedule
repayment of its capital ﬁnancing costs to match the realization of revenues
from its investments (Myers 1977). If a ﬁrm’s revenues are completely uncor-
related with market interest rates, it could minimize the risk of future ﬁnancial
distress by funding long-term investments with long-term, ﬁxed-rate debt and
short-term investments with short-term debt.
Long-term lending carries substantial risks from an outside investor’s view-
point, however. A borrower’s ﬁnancial condition can deteriorate substantially
over the term of the loan. Moreover, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) note,
management has an incentive to take actions that beneﬁt shareholders at the
expense of creditors once a ﬁrm has received the proceeds of the loan. As
an example, management can pursue high-risk strategies or otherwise attempt
to dissipate the organization’s assets by paying excessive dividends. Creditors
could prevent such behavior if (1) they always knew as much about a ﬁrm’s
investment opportunities as its managers and (2) they could monitor manage-
ment’s behavior costlessly. But such actions are prohibitively costly for most
creditors, if even feasible, for they would involve duplicating essentially all
the functions of management. For these reasons, bondholders often demand
loan covenants that limit management’s discretion in deploying loan proceeds.
Typically such covenants give creditors the right to exercise greater control
over the ﬁrm when a condition of the loan is violated or in the event of a
material deterioration in its ﬁnancial condition. To be certain, enforcement of
loan covenants still requires some monitoring on the part of creditors. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) argue that these monitoring costs are ultimately borne by
borrowers through higher interest rates.
Wall (1989) argues that the existence of agency costs is one reason that
quality spreads widen with debt maturity. He notes that while established ﬁrms
with good credit ratings and access to low-cost credit have incentives to limit
risks, newer and smaller ﬁrms do not have the same incentives. Like Loeys
(1985), Wall gives special emphasis to the inﬂuence creditors can exercise
over borrowers when renegotiating short-term loans. Wall was among the ﬁrst
to observe that synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing carries different incentives for
borrowers than actual ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing. To understand why this might be
so, notice that the interest rate lenders charge a borrower when renewing a
short-term loan can change for two reasons: (1) a change in market interest
rates or (2) a change in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit-quality risk premium. Interest
rate swaps compensate the borrower only for changes in market rates, and not
for changes in the short-term quality spread. Thus, as noted earlier, the cost
of synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing is rs + [rb(t) − rs(t)], the swap ﬁxed rate plus
the quality spread between the rate the ﬁrm pays on its short-term debt and
the swap ﬂoating-rate index. A ﬁrm that chooses synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing        
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faces the risk that the quality spread [rb(t) − rs(t)] might rise if lenders realize
that management has increased the ﬁrm’s riskiness. In extreme cases, the ﬁrm
might even ﬁnd itself unable to roll over its outstanding short-term debt and
be forced into bankruptcy proceedings.
Wall’s (1989) rationale for interest rate swaps lies with the observation
that synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing should discourage management from pursu-
ing risky investment strategies.7 According to this argument, interest rate swaps
lower funding costs by controlling the adverse incentives a ﬁrm’s management
might have to increase the risk assumed by the ﬁrm to the detriment of creditors.
Thus, interest rate swaps do make it possible for ﬁrms to reduce ﬁnancing costs
in Wall’s theory. But the savings attributable to the use of swaps result from
lower agency costs and do not constitute arbitrage in the sense that term is
normally understood.
The Problem of Adverse Selection:
More Incentives to Borrow Short and Swap into Fixed
Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) investigate the determinants of debt matu-
rity by focusing attention on the incentives borrowers have to signal information
to lenders about their ﬁnancial condition. Their analysis is based on the assump-
tion that outside investors have imperfect information about ﬁrms, and so are
unable to discriminate perfectly between safe ﬁrms and relatively risky ﬁrms.
If outside investors cannot perfectly discriminate between risky and safe ﬁrms,
they will demand default-risk premiums on long-term debt that may appear
excessively high to relatively safe borrowers. Conversely, the managers of a
risky ﬁrm recognize that there is a high probability that the organization’s
ﬁnancial condition will deteriorate, leading them to prefer long-term debt over
short-term debt.
Firms that lenders can identify as risky borrowers have difﬁculty securing
long-term loans and are forced to issue short-term debt that matures before the
returns to an investment are realized. Often such ﬁrms must obtain their credit
lines from banks, which specialize in credit evaluation and are well positioned
to monitor the ﬁrm’s activities. In the event that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition
deteriorates, lenders can demand a higher interest rate upon reﬁnancing, can
further restrict the discretion of management, can engage in more intensive
monitoring, can take some combination of these actions, or can even refuse to
reﬁnance outstanding debt. A ﬁrm that defaults on its outstanding debt obliga-
tions can be forced into bankruptcy proceedings.
If a ﬁrm’s management believes that default premiums on long-term loans
are excessive, it might choose a short-term funding strategy. By voluntarily
7 Diamond (1984) makes a similar observation regarding the optimal hedging behavior of
ﬁrms, although he does not discuss the rationale for interest rate swaps per se.   
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taking on liquidity risk, management can signal that it does not expect the
ﬁrm’s condition to deteriorate in the future. Over time a ﬁrm that consistently
demonstrates its ability to meet its ﬁnancial obligations develops a reputation as
a safe ﬁrm. Thus, a safe ﬁrm might employ a short-term funding strategy until
it can convince creditors to extend long-term loans on better terms (Diamond
1991).
One drawback to such a strategy is that it can leave the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows
unhedged. Arak, Estrella, Goodman, and Silver (1988) stress that interest rate
swaps are not redundant securities, but offer ﬁrms new ﬁnancing choices that
were not previously available in credit markets. Like Wall (1989), Arak et al.
note that synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing requires the borrower to bear the risk of
changes in the short-term credit-risk premium. Their hypothesized rationale for
interest rate swaps differs somewhat from that of Wall, however. They hypoth-
esize that ﬁrms may have an incentive to bear rollover risk when management
is more optimistic about a ﬁrm’s future prospects than the market. If a ﬁrm’s
management is optimistic about its ﬁnancial condition, it may choose to issue
short-term debt in the expectation that the quality spread will fall in the future.
In effect, the ﬁrm speculates on its own quality spread while using swaps to
immunize itself against market risk.
Titman (1992) and Minton (1993a) derive conditions under which a ﬁrm’s
best strategy is to use interest rate swaps in conjunction with short-term ﬁnanc-
ing. Like Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991), Titman and Minton emphasize
that ﬁrms may have an incentive to bear the liquidity risk associated with
short-term debt ﬁnance as a means of signaling management’s belief that the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial prospects will improve. Titman ﬁnds conditions under which
synthetic ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing gives ﬁrms an incentive to undertake safer invest-
ments. Minton ﬁnds that giving ﬁrms the option of using interest rate swaps
can reduce default risk and, in doing so, increase the capacity of ﬁrms to under-
take productive long-term investment. Both Titman and Minton ﬁnd plausible
conditions under which interest rate swaps reduce ﬁnancing costs, albeit not
through the channels of ﬁnancial arbitrage.
Notice that the basic logic of the adverse selection rationale runs closely
parallel to that of Wall’s (1989) agency cost rationale. While borrowers in
Titman and Minton’s models choose short-term ﬁnancing to signal manage-
ment’s belief that the ﬁrm is creditworthy, the act of taking on short-term debt
mitigates incentives to take on added risk once loan proceeds are received, just
as Wall predicts.
Incentives to Borrow Fixed and Swap into Floating
The preceding discussion has focused on the incentives ﬁrms might have to
enter into a swap as a ﬁxed-rate payer. But every swap agreement must also
have a ﬂoating-rate payer. Wall (1989) and Titman (1992) hypothesize that   
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ﬂoating-rate payers share in the gains ﬁxed-rate payers receive from synthetic
ﬁxed-rate ﬁnancing. Litzenberger (1992) notes at least two reasons why highly
rated ﬁrms may be able to lower funding costs by issuing callable ﬁxed-rate
debt and then swapping into synthetic ﬂoating-rate debt. First, like Wall and
Titman, he hypothesizes that ﬂoating-rate payers essentially act as ﬁnancial
intermediaries that earn income in return for managing a diversiﬁed portfolio
of risky contractual obligations. The total exposure resulting from this activ-
ity is small, he argues, because (1) the credit risk associated with an interest
rate swap is much smaller than that associated with actual lending; (2) most
swap agreements take place among parties with at least single A credit ratings
(lower-rated counterparties are rejected or required to post collateral); and (3)
a diversiﬁed swap portfolio has little risk of a large credit loss.
Second, Litzenberger also notes that the highly rated AAA ﬁrms that typ-
ically become ﬂoating-rate payers often issue callable ﬁxed-rate notes, and
then sell the prepayment options on these notes by selling callable swaps to
swap dealers. He argues that such transactions can create synthetic ﬂoating-rate
ﬁnancing at a modest savings in cost because the prepayment options attached
to ﬁxed-rate debt tend to be underpriced, probably because of a past history
of non-optimal exercises on such options. Thus, Litzenberger attributes at least
part of the incentive to become a ﬂoating-rate payer to arbitrage opportunities
created by the mispricing of prepayment options for corporate bonds.
Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1988) emphasize that interest rate swaps
can help to conserve on transactions costs. As an example, they note that it
can be cheaper to sell an interest rate swap than to call and refund outstanding
ﬁxed-rate debt.
4. A COMPARISON OF INTEREST RATE FUTURES AND
INTEREST RATE SWAPS
A discussion of the economic role of interest rate swaps would not be complete
without at least some mention of interest rate futures. Interest rate futures can
be used to create synthetic ﬁxed-rate debt in much the same way as interest rate
futures. In particular, selling a “strip,” or sequence, of Eurodollar futures with
successive maturity dates can be compared to buying an interest rate swap.
To see how interest rate futures can substitute for an interest rate swap,
recall that the buyer (ﬁxed-rate payer) of an interest rate swap receives a net
payment from the seller whenever the ﬂoating-rate index exceeds the swap
ﬁxed rate. In the case of a generic swap with a ﬂoating rate indexed to some
maturity of LIBOR, the buyer receives the difference in interest on the no-
tional principal amount whenever the speciﬁed maturity of LIBOR exceeds the
swap ﬁxed rate. When LIBOR is below the ﬁxed rate, the buyer must pay the
difference in interest to the seller.     
64 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Selling a strip of Eurodollar futures creates a similar pattern of returns
and payments. The seller of a Eurodollar contract receives the difference in
interest on the notional principal ($1 million) when the futures rate negotiated
at the outset of the agreement turns out to be less than the value of three-month
LIBOR prevailing on the contract maturity date. Otherwise, the seller must pay
the difference in interest to the buyer. Thus, selling a strip of Eurodollar futures
produces a return stream comparable to that of a generic interest rate swap.
Because of this similarity, an implied swap rate can be derived from Eurodollar
futures rates.8 Minton (1993b) ﬁnds evidence that the behavior of swap market
rates is closely related to this implied swap rate.
These observations suggest that much of the rationale for interest rate swaps
discussed above must also apply to interest rate futures—in particular, to Eu-
rodollar futures. The foregoing discussion has focused on interest rate swaps
because the growth of trading in Eurodollar futures in recent years appears
to have been driven by the growth of the swap market. Although trading in
Eurodollar futures predates the advent of the interest rate swap, trading was
limited to contracts extending two years into the future at the time of the ﬁrst
widely publicized interest rate swap in 1982. As a result, Eurodollar futures
were not as well suited for use in creating synthetic long-term ﬁnancing as
were interest rate swaps. More recently, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange has
begun listing Eurodollar futures for delivery as far as ten years into the future.
Burghardt et al. (1991) attribute the recent expansion of trading in Eurodollar
futures to the growth of the interest rate swap market. Swap dealers in partic-
ular often use Eurodollar futures to hedge their commitments. Thus, although
interest rate futures contracts can substitute for interest rate swaps, it was the
growth of the swap market that had the greatest effect on corporate ﬁnance.
Kawaller (1990) and Minton (1993b) discuss the factors inﬂuencing the
choice between interest rate futures and interest rate swaps. Kawaller empha-
sizes transactions costs and other practical considerations of managing a futures
position as key factors inﬂuencing the choice between interest rate futures and
interest rate swaps. The main beneﬁt of a swap is that it can be custom-tailored
to the needs of an individual ﬁrm, so that managing an interest rate swap is
relatively easy compared to managing a futures market position. A ﬁrm that
enters into an interest rate swap faces a set schedule for receiving or making
its payments. As long as nothing happens to change the ﬁrm’s underlying
exposure to interest rates—that is, as long as nothing has happened to change
the reasons the ﬁrm decided to create synthetic ﬁxed- or ﬂoating-rate ﬁnancing
in the ﬁrst place—managing an outstanding swap position merely requires the
ﬁrm’s treasurer to make or collect scheduled payments.
8 For more detailed expositions, see Burghardt et al. (1991) and Kawaller (1990).      
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The principal disadvantage of interest rate swaps relative to interest rate
futures lies with counterparty credit risk. Exchange-traded instruments such
as interest rate futures are backed by a system of margin requirements, along
with the guarantee of the exchange clearinghouse (which, in turn, is jointly
backed by the paid-in capital of the clearinghouse member ﬁrms). This system
of safeguards removes virtually all risk of default in the futures market. In
contrast, a counterparty to an interest rate swap is exposed to the risk that the
other counterparty might default. To be certain, most interest rate swaps take
place between relatively creditworthy counterparties. Nonetheless, credit risk
is a greater concern with interest rate swaps than with futures contracts.
The very factors that make interest rate futures safer also make managing
a futures position somewhat more challenging than managing a swap commit-
ment, however. First, a party to a futures contract is required to post margin
before being permitted to buy or sell a futures contract. Second, the futures
exchanges mark all outstanding positions to market at the end of each trading
session, adding any realized gains or subtracting any realized losses from each
trader’s margin account. While this procedure minimizes default risk, it ex-
poses any party with an open futures position to the risk of margin calls. As a
consequence, payments are less predictable in the short run with a futures po-
sition than with an interest rate swap. Third, futures contracts are standardized
agreements. Contract standardization, along with the clearinghouse guarantee,
facilitates trading in futures contracts. Futures markets tend to be more liquid
than OTC markets (and actual cash markets for that matter) as a result, lowering
transactions costs. But while contract standardization facilitates trading, it also
means that an interest rate futures contract will almost never be perfectly suited
to the needs of any one trader.9 Thus, an interest rate futures position requires
greater monitoring and can be more difﬁcult to execute unless a ﬁrm maintains
a staff devoted to trading futures contracts.
While the factors that determine the choice between interest rate futures
and interest rate swaps is of great interest to practitioners, it has not received
a great deal of attention in the academic ﬁnance literature. Minton’s (1993a)
model of the hedging behavior of ﬁrms is a noteworthy exception. Minton ﬁnds
that relatively safe ﬁrms—ﬁrms that expect their future credit-quality spreads
to fall—may have an incentive to choose swaps over futures contracts so as to
avoid the cost of margin requirements.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The reasons for the extraordinary growth of the swap market in recent years are
not yet fully understood. But there seems to be a consensus that the market has
9 For a more detailed description of futures exchanges and interest rate futures, see Kuprianov
(1993a).    
66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
developed because interest rate swaps offer ﬁrms ﬁnancing choices that were
not available before the advent of these instruments. In this respect, interest
rate swaps represent a true ﬁnancial innovation.
The early rationale offered for the existence of the market—that ﬁrms used
interest rate swaps to arbitrage credit market inefﬁciencies—cannot by itself
explain the exponential growth of the market over the past decade. By the same
token, it is unlikely that ﬁrms would use interest rate swaps if they did not lower
ﬁnancing costs in some way. Recent research suggests at least two reasons why
ﬁrms use interest rate swaps. First, in cases where a ﬁrm’s management expects
its ﬁnancial condition to improve, interest rate swaps make it possible for ﬁrms
to hedge against changes in market interest rates while avoiding excessive
ﬁxed-rate quality-spread premiums. Second, interest rate swaps make possible
ﬁnancial arrangements that reduce the incentives of borrowing ﬁrms to take on
added risk at the expense of creditors.
Conceived in the wake of unprecedented interest rate volatility brought
about by a decade of accelerating inﬂation, the interest rate swap was born of
necessity. In a period of low interest rate volatility, the choice between short-
and long-term borrowing was primarily a choice between ﬁxed and ﬂoating
credit-quality spreads. With rising interest rate volatility, however, the ability
to separate the effects of changes in market rates from changes in credit-quality
spreads became more valuable, leading ﬁrms to experiment with alternative
ﬁnancing schemes. Based on the results of recent research, it appears that
interest rate swaps have helped ﬁrms to weather the uncertainties of volatile
ﬁnancial markets by reducing default risk and facilitating increased productive
investment.
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